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The Cubic Public-Key Transformation
Subhash Kak
Abstract
We propose the use of the cubic transformation for public-key ap-
plications and digital signatures. Transformations modulo a prime p
or a composite n = pq, where p and q are primes, are used in such
a fashion that each transformed value has only 3 roots that makes
it a more efficient transformation than the squaring transformation
of Rabin, which has 4 roots. Such a transformation, together with
additional tag information, makes it possible to uniquely invert each
transformed value. The method may be used for other exponents as
well.
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1 Introduction
Certain many-to-one mappings, when used together with additional side in-
formation, may be uniquely inverted and used for public-key cryptography
and digital signatures. Given message m in Zn, we propose the use of the
encryption function c = m3 mod n under suitable restrictions on m and n.
We will be primarily interested in the case where 3 divides the Euler totient
function φ(n), but 9 does not.
For secure communication, Alice transmits to Bob c together with side
information which may be sent in an encrypted form or published.
This transformation is more efficient than the mapping c = m2 mod n
proposed by Michael Rabin [1] that has the virtue of being provably at most
as intractable as the factorization of n. In his article, Rabin did consider
generalization beyond the squaring function, but he dismissed the use of
higher powers for their relative inefficiency. Specifically, he spoke of the 9
cube roots in the cubic mapping, having implicitly taken n to be divisible by
9, which made it less efficient than the squaring transformation with its four
roots.
The n that we choose ensures only three cube roots for each value mak-
ing it more efficient than the squaring transformation. We also consider
extensions of our side information scheme to the case when n is divisible by
9. Given its easy implementation, the proposed cubic transformation lends
itself to public key applications. Specifically,
• It makes additional exponents available in exponentiation transforma-
tions [2,3] and for key-distribution systems that use powers of primitive
roots.
• It makes it possible to use a small exponent to send information and
implement digital signatures.
• It allows the generation of probability events based on whether the
parity of the bit chosen by the recipient is the same as the one picked
at the sending point.
2 The properties of the cubic transformation
Consider first the transformation c = m3 mod p, where p = 3k + 1 is prime,
and p = 3 mod 4. Since p−1 and 3 have at least one common divisor (namely
3), this transformation is not one-to-one, and because of the cubing operation
3 different values of m map to the same c.
If p−1 is not divisible by 9, one can obtain one of the three values of c1/3
by means of an inverse exponentiation operation:
c1/3 =
{
c
p+2
9 if p− 1 mod 9 = 6
c
2p+1
9 if p− 1 mod 9 = 3 (1)
The proof of this assertion is in the fact that cp−1 = 1 by Fermat’s Little
Theorem and ca(p−1)+3 = c3. Consequently, c
a(p−1)+3
9 = c1/3. If p− 1 mod 9 =
6, then p+ 2 is divisible by 9; if p−1 mod 9 = 3, then 2(p−1)+3 is divisible
by 9.
An inverse cannot be obtained by exponentiation if p − 1 is divisible by
9.
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The cube roots of 1 are 1, α and α2 because if α is a root, so is its square.
This implies that if one of the cube roots of c is m, the others must be mα
and mα2.
The three cube roots of 1 may be obtained by solving the equation:
α3 − 1 = 0 (2)
Apart from the obvious solution of 1, the other two solutions are obtained
by solving α2+α+1 = 0, which is possible if the square root of
√
p− 3 exists.
This may be determined by the use of Euler’s criterion that b is square modulo
p if and only if
b(p−1)/2 = 1 mod p
Since p = 3 mod 4, the square root a1/2 = a
p+1
4 , and we can write,
α =
−1 ±√1− 4
2
=
1
2
(−1± (p− 3) p+14 ) (3)
Since the two roots can also be written as α and α2, the value of α may be
equivalently expressed as:
α =
−1 + (p− 3) p+14
−1− (p− 3) p+14
(4)
If the square root of (p − 3) does not exist, one must use a probabilistic
method to determine α.
Note that 1+α+α2 = 0 mod p. This follows from the fact that (1+α+
α2)3 = 1. This means that the value of α2 may be obtained by subtraction.
The complexity of this computation is no more than that of exponentia-
tion.
Example 1. Consider c = m3 mod 31.
To compute α, we must first find
√−3 = √28. This can be reduced
by using the transformation 28
31+1
4 = 288 which is equal to 20. Therefore,
α = −21/2, 19/2, which may be reduced to 5 and 25. The cube roots of 1
are, therefore, 1, 5, 25. We may pick one of these, say 5, as α.
Let Alice choose m = 7. She computes m, mα, mα2, which are 4, 20, 7.
Rearranging them in order, she gets 4, 7, 20 that correspond to the ranks 1,
2, 3, and thus the side information related to her choice of m is 2.
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Alice sends c = 73 mod 31 = 2, together with the rank information of 2
(that is either published or sent in an encrypted form separately) to Bob.
Using equation (1), Bob finds that one of its cube roots is 27 mod 31 = 4.
The other cube roots will be 4× 5 = 20 mod 31, and 20× 5 = 7 mod 31.
The side information then helps him pick m = 7 as the message sent by
Alice.
Table 1: Mapping for p = 31, α = 5
Values of m, mα, mα2 The output c
1, 5, 25 1
2, 10, 19 8
3, 15, 13 27
4, 20, 7 2
6, 30, 26 30
8, 9, 14 16
11, 24, 27 29
12, 29, 21 23
16, 18, 28 4
17, 23, 22 15
3 Cubic transformation modulo a composite
number
We now consider the cubic transformation modulo n = pq, where φ(n) =
(p− 1)(q − 1) is divisible by 3 but not 9. Then the inverse is given by:
c1/3 =

 c
φ(n)+3
9 if φ(n) mod 9 = 6
c
2φ(n)+3
9 if φ(n) mod 9 = 3
(5)
The method of inverse transformation is identical to that in the previous
section, excepting that under certain circumstances the computation of α
will require solving equation (2) modulo the two prime factors of n and then
combining them to get the answer modulo n. Both Alice and Bob know the
factors of n, but the eavesdropper does not.
Example 2. Consider c = m3 mod 77; p = 7, q = 11. To find the value of
α by the method of equation (3), we must obtain
√
p− 3 = √74. But 74 is
4
not square modulo 77, therefore, we find the solution directly by the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT), by solving:
α3 − 1 = 0
separately for the two moduli 7 and 11. We can try to obtain these solutions
using the method of equation (3). Note that only one new solution is required
to fix α and, therefore, it is not essential that solutions to both the primes
are found.
For p=7, p− 3 = 4 is square modulo 7, and, therefore, the solutions are
easily obtained:
αp = 2, 4
But 8 is not square modulo 11, therefore, equation (3) cannot be used for
it. We, therefore, merely use the obvious solution:
αq = 1
Combining, using the CRT,
α = αp × q × ||q−1||p + αq × p× ||p−1||q mod pq (6)
where ||x||y = x mod y.
Since 7−1 mod 11 = 8, and 11−1 mod 7 = 2, we have:
α1 = 2× 11× 2 + 1× 7× 8 = 100 = 23 mod 77
as the first value, and
α2 = 4× 11× 2 + 1× 7× 8 = 144 = 67 mod 77
as the second value.
It is assumed that Alice and Bob have chosen in advance to use α = 23
for their communications.
Consider the message Alice wishes to send is m = 12. As in the previous
case, she finds its companions by multiplying it successively by α = 23, thus
obtaining 34, and 45. The rank order of her message is 1.
She now performs the cubic transformation on her message 12, sending
Bob c = 34 together with the side information of 1.
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Bob find its three cube roots by first calculating c1/3 = c7 = 347 = 34.
The other cube roots are:
34× 23 = 12 mod 77
and
34× 67 = 45 mod 77
Bob knows that the message was one of the three 12, 34, and 45. The
side information tells him that the specific message out of this set is 12.
Since there are three solutions, the side information will require 2 bits.
4 φ(n) divisible by 9
The method proposed will actually work even for φ(n) that is divisible by
9. Although each number will now have 9 cube roots, they may be bunched
together in separate groups in a variety of ways.
The 9 cube roots of 1 may be obtained by solving
α9 − 1 = 0 (7)
which may be simplified to:
(α− 1)(α2 + α + 1)(α6 + α3 + 1) = 0 (8)
Let the cube roots of 1 be put in numerical order and labeled 1 through
9. Alice would take the message she wishes to send to Bob and find all the
multiples of it with the cube roots of 1, and find its relative position in the
set. Then she will send the original message with this position number as
side information.
Bob will obtain the cube root of c and then list all its companion solutions.
Given the position number, he will then be able to determine its value.
Example 3. Consider c = m3 mod 91, where φ(n) = 72. Since 88 is square
modulo 91, one can use equation (3) to determine the cube roots of 1 modulo
91, and a simple calculation gives us the values 9 and 81. Since 9 and 81
are not cubes themselves, we cannot use equation (8) to find the remaining
cube roots. Additional cube roots of 1 are obtained by solving the equation
α3 − 1 = 0 for the two moduli 7 and 13 (4 and 10 are square modulo 7 and
6
13, respectively) and using CRT to combine the results. We end up with the
following 9 cube roots of 1: 1, 9, 16, 22, 29, 53, 74, 79, 81.
Assume Alice wishes to send the message 24 (which is relatively prime
to 91, and therefore it has 9 cube roots) to Bob. She finds the multiples of
24 with the cube roots of 1, and obtains the set: 20, 24, 33, 34, 47, 59, 73,
76, and 89. The sequence number of 24 is 2, and this number is sent as side
information, together with 243 = 83.
Bob first finds the cube root of 83 by the use of CRT or some probabilistic
algorithm. Suppose, this number is 33. Now he computes the multiples of
33 with all the cube roots of 1, obtaining: 33, 24, 73, 89, 47, 20, 76, 59, 34.
Since the side information has revealed that the message has the second rank
in this set, he now knows that it is 24.
Probability events
The 9 cube roots of 1 may be written as numbers and their squares:
1, a, b, c, d, a2, b2, c2, d2 (9)
These may be bunched together in 3 groups. Alternatively, if it is agreed
by Alice and Bob that each group of three have 1 in it, these numbers may
be put in four groups in the following manner:
1, a, a2; 1, b, b2; 1, c, c2; 1, d, d2 (10)
Thus, in our example, the four sets will be:
1, 9, 81; 1, 16, 74; 1, 22, 29; 1, 53, 79
Let the protocol require that Bob pick one of these four sets. Bob is
also told the rank order within each subgroup. His chances of obtaining the
correct message are 1
4
.
It is clear that the groupings could be done differently as well. But
whichever way the groupings are done, they are incorporated in the protocol
of the communicating parties.
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5 Generalizations
Generalizations of this method to higher exponents may be readily made.
The method of tags may also be applied to the squaring transformation.
Once a square roots α of 1 (other than 1 or n − 1) is known, the full set of
solutions follows:
1, α, n− 1, n− α
One needs 2 bits of side information to uniquely identify the message m
that gave rise to the received c.
For kth-roots of 1 related to the solution to c = mk mod n, k odd, the
number of groups to generate probability events in the manner of equation
(10) will be k + 1, that is k
2
−1
k−1
, corresponding to the probability of 1
k+1
.
Random number generation
The cubic transformation may also be used to generate random numbers si
in a manner analogous to the squaring transformation [4]. Let s0 be the
seed and let n = pq for primes p, q, where φ(n) is divisible by 9, and s0 is
relatively prime to n, then,
si = (si−1)
3 mod n (11)
The condition of divisibility of φ(n) by 9 is to increase the computational bur-
den of inverting the transformation. The tree of possibilities has 9 branches
at each step.
For a cryptographically strong random number generator to radix-r that
generates the sequence ci, one may reduce the numbers si to the modulus r,
where r < n:
ci = si mod r (12)
For binary random numbers generated by this equation, r will be 2.
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